TALKING TO OURSELVES: SKEPTICISM, INTENTIONS, AND COMMITMENTS IN SELF-TALK
Author
Hartman, Jack ChristianIssue Date
2024Advisor
Reimer, Marga
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The University of Arizona.Rights
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.Abstract
In her "What Is the Purpose of Self-Talk," Felicity Deamer challenges the conventional belief that individuals possess a clear understanding of their communicative intentions before speaking, suggesting that such intentions are often only partially accessible. Drawing upon Grice's communication model, Deamer argues that this partial self-blindness creates an information gap between pre- and post-speech moments, thus allowing self-talk to have a communicative purpose. However, objections emerge regarding the criteria for knowing intentions and the significance of non-verbal cues. The skeptical implications of Deamer's argument are addressed at length, prompting the following tradeoff: (1) Either non-verbal cues enable us to know our communicative intentions, sacrificing the possibility of Gricean communication, or (2) maintain partial self-blindness, preserving Gricean communication, but at the cost of skepticism. This dilemma opens broader inquiries about communicative intentions and the nature of self-talk in general. Finally, the paper takes up Geurts' speech-act account of assertions in self-talk, capturing their overlooked usefulness as commitment-binding and context-providing tools.Type
Electronic Thesistext
Degree Name
B.A.Degree Level
bachelorsDegree Program
PhilosophyHonors College