Rescuing Moral Empiricism

Abstract

The motivating thought underlying my work in this dissertation is that empirical evidence sometimes counts as moral evidence—that is, evidence for and against normative theories, principles, actions, and values. This view I call moderate moral empiricism, for while few would deny minimal moral empiricism (e.g., acknowledging that how much whiskey one has drunk before ethical reasoning matters), many reject the idea that empirical facts can play a substantial evidential role in our moral theorizing. My primary positive argument is that our dominant moral methodology presupposes that some empirical evidence is genuinely moral evidence. In the first chapter, I rescue G.A. Cohen’s influential argument from poor exegesis for an autonomy thesis commonly thought to oppose empiricism in moral and political philosophy. I argue that it does not oppose my view, but may well still strike its intended target: Rawls. In the second chapter, I give the positive theoretical argument for moral empiricism. I argue that our dominant moral methodology—reflective equilibrium—presupposes a moderate moral empiricism. In the third and fourth chapters, I examine a certain kind of empirical evidence: moral testimony. I argue moral deference is not different in kind from nonmoral deference, though moral deference is in general more suspect due to a convergence of factors. I also use cases of moral deference in the medical field to indirectly challenge those condemning of moral deference. In the final chapter, I provide a new case for a pluralistic moral framework that should satisfy the moderate moral empiricist and the moderate moral rationalist. The theory has notable parallels with the structure of Ross’s ethics.